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Whither patent system?
R. MURALIDHARAN

1. Introduction
Economists swear that healthy competition ensures the best possible deal for the
general public. However, the law itself grants certain monopolies, supposedly for the
overall economic growth. The patent system constitutes one such exception to the
general rule of free competition. A patent is a monopoly limited in time granted by
the state for an invention having commercial application. The existence of the patent
system is supposed to stimulate inventions to enhance the quality of human life.
Traditionally, two theories have been advanced to justify the existence of patent
system. They are (1) Incentive theory; (2) Disclosure theory.! According to the first
theory, the possibility of acquiring monopolistic rights over one's invention stimulates
further inventions. Abraham Lincoln succinctly summed this up, "Patents add fuel to
-the fire of genius". On the other hand, the advocates of Disclosure theory contended
that the system encourages inventors to disclose their inventions to the general public
instead of keeping it a trade secret. This disclosure enables the general public to use
the invention freely after the expiry of the monopoly period.
Patent law in India was conceived by the colonial regime, essentially to ensure
the monopoly of Britishers over industrial products. This is probably the reason that
India was kept out of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
(1883): After independence, the Government of India appointed a committee under
the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice Rajagopala Iyengar to suggest reforms to the Indian
Patent System. Justice Iyengar and the Banks Committee Report of the U.K. justified
the continuance of the patent system on the following grounds.2
The opportunity of acquiring exclusive rights over one's inventions stimulates
inventions in the following ways. It encourages research and innovation. Secondly, it
induces an inventor to disclose his discoveries to the public instead of keeping it a
trade secret. Thirdly, it offers a reward for developing an invention from its
conception to the stage at which it becomes commercially viable. Fourthly, it provides
an inducement to invest capital in new lines of production which may not be profitable
1.
2.

Law and State, Volume 20 (1979) Hans Peter Kunz Hallesteing. Patent Protection and Transfer of
Technologies to Developing Countries, p-:87-108at pp. 90-91.
Rajagopala Iyengar, Report on the Revision of Patent Law (1959), New Delhi, paragraphs 17 to 21.
Ballks Committee Report 011 Patent Systems alld Patent Law, United Kingdom Cmnd 4407, HMSO
(July 1970).
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if competing producers embark upon it simultaneously. Finally, manufacturers will
not be prepared to develop and produce novel machinery, if others could also reap
the benefits of the former's innovations.
In the following page~, an attempt will be made to expose the fallacy behind
these arguments and analyse whether the patent system - as practised and perpetuated
by the industrialized developed world - suits the needs of the developing nations. the
paper will also propose alternative systems to ensure encouragement to innovators.

2. Is patent system an incentive to innovation?
The first argument adduced in support of the continuance of the patent system,
viz., that it encourages research and innovation, is no longer good. It must be borne in
mind that the first patent system of the world was enacted in 1474 by the Republic of
Venice, and gained significance only after the Industrial Revolution. During the time,
as a tule, inventions were made by a few individuals who often devoted their entire
lifetime, money and energy in developing them. They did it for the sake of their own
satisfaction and for enhancing the quality of human life. The patent system may have
been a just reward for those committed individuals. But with the advent of the 20th
century and Transnational Corporations (TNCs), gone are the days of individual
'innovators.3 Now-a-days, creation ofH:chnology is a capital intensive activity, pursued
only by the Transnational Corporations and Government aided research institutions.4
For Transnational Corporations, superior technology provides an edge over their
competitors in marketing their products. Hence, whether there is a patent system or
not, Transnational Corporations will continue to invest monies in Research and
Development so that they can maintain their technological superiority and thus ensure
better marketability of their products. Government aided research institutions carry
on research for the avowed purpose of technological diffusion among the masses so
that productivity of the people improves substantially. Though these institutions apply
for and obtain patents at considerable expense, the commercial exploitation of these
3.

4.

Vlf Anderfelt, International Patellt Legislations and Developing Countries, (1971) Martinus Nijhoff.
The Hague Page, 29-35. The author has posed the following five questions to assess the momentous
change that has occurred in this connection. They are: (1) Who is doing research today? (2) Who is
supplying tlt~ financial means? (3) Who is exploiting the results? (4) What are the characteristics of
the inventive' process and the relationship between the number of patents and the amount of
research? (5) The relationship between the inventor and innovator/employer.
In India the lion's share of R & D work is pursued by Government aided research institutions. The
following Table indicates the amount spent on R & D by various agencies in India.
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patents and the income by way of royalties remain far from satisfactory.s Moreover,
these institutions conduct Research and Development on a specific mandate from the
Government, and hence the patent system does not provide any incentive whatsoever.
Assuming that the species of individual innovators has not become extinct, their
inventions are not motivated by profit or are motivated by profit in such a small
degree that a special reward may not be necessary. Further, a monopoly over their
invention is not necessarily the most desirable reward. It can well be in the form of a
cash award. If the inventions of the individual inventors are generated by an instinct of
creative curiosity rather than by search of profit, the existence of patent monopoly
cannot be. justified. Furthermore, the \quantum of innovation is not directly
proportional to the existence of pecuniary incentives, but depends upon the free
availability of previously-accumulated knowledge. In fact, the three great inventions
that totally changed world history - the mariner's compass, gunpowder and paper originated in Oriental Societies which believed in sharing useful knowledge with all,
instead of keeping it a secret. Fritz Machulp reported that there is neither empirical
nor theoretical evidence so far presented to support the frequently made claim that
the patent system is an important factor in technological or economic progress.6
Hence it can be safely assert~d that research and innovation will continue, irrespective
of the existence of the patent system and justification of the patent system on the
ground that it encourages research and innovation is not correct.

3. Does the patent system really induce the inventor to disclo~e his
invention to the public?
The second argument that demands the continuance of the patent system, viz., it
induces an inventor to disclose his invention, instead of keeping it a trade secret will
not stand objective scrutiny. If an invention can easily be kept a secret, patent
protection will not even be sought (eg) formula of the Coco Cola Concentrate. Again
if a process or method is peculiar to the needs of one firm, enjoying a modest market,
patent protection will not provide any incentive to go ahead with further research. On
the other hand, if there is a booming demand for the product and a cluster of envious
5.

6.

John V. Granger, Technology and Intel7lotionol Relations, (1979). W.H. Freeman & Co., San
Francisco, points out that many countries have established special institutions to encourage the
exploitation of government and privately held patents. If the commercial exploitation of the
ipvention requires further investments, these organizations provide low interest loans to be repaid
out of the future profits. The United Kingdom established, in 1949, The 'National Research
Development Corporation (NRDC) to promote commercial exploitation of their patents. Over 23
years time, it issued 1413 domestic and 84 foreign licences, out of their 12,634patents and earned a
revenue of £ 18 millions. The corresponding direct expenses for palent filing and maintenance of
patents was approximately £ 2 millions. The owners of privately held patents were paid £ 3 millions
as royalties. The administrative expenses of NRDC (including R & D subsidy) amounted £ 10
millions, hence a total of £ 15 millions. Though the venture can be considered a success by strict
rules of accountancy, further research on this issue indicates the risks involved. A single patent for
antibiotic accounted for more than 50% of the cumulative income from licensing. Just 9 patents
accounted for more than 90% of the total income. The dependence of NRDC on just 9 out of the
total 12,634 patents is a typical indication of the high risks involved in the venture. The Indian
Public Sector has a relatively poorer track record than its British counterpart. Hence the possibility
of Indian NRDC taking advantage of the. International Patent System is quite bleak.
F. Machulp, An Economic Review of Patent System, (1958) for Senate Committee of Judiciary and
Sub..(;qmmittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, Monograph Study No. 15.
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competitors, then patent protection will be sought immediately on the discovery ot the
inventive concept.7 Hence, much depends on the demand for the invented product and
existence of fierce competition.
Though patents are liable to be annulled for insufficient disclosure of the
method of performing the innovation, it is unrealistic to expect the inventor to
disclose his invention in full. As secrecy of the technology will bring more commercial
returns to the manufacturers, an inventor is unlikely to disclose the invention in full in
the patent specification. He will just disclose the bare skeleton of his invention to
meet the requirement of the patent laws. Besides the information contained in the
patent specification, a great deal of production expertise may be necessary, in order to
enter the production market and compete efficiently. In the course of working the
patent, the patentee would have gathered a lot of useful information regarding the
raw materials, contaminants, lubricants, catalysts, handling procedures, etc., which
could significantly reduce the production costs. This production expertise, or
unpatented secret knowledge, is absolutely necessary to exploit any patent and is
called the "know-how". The "know-how" is regarded as property distinct from the
patent grant. Though "know-how"is not legally protected as a species of property, it
is effectively enforced by virtue of the patent grant. This "know-how" will not be
forthcoming from the patentee along with the patent application. Hence the argument
that a patent system establishes some kind of a 'technology bank', thereby facilitating
any interested person to work that invention after the patent monopoly had expired, is
not correct. Further more this argument has completely lost its relevance because of
the speed of technological change. The inventions are becoming obsolete faster than
even before. Normally, a patent has a life span of 14 years in India.8 By the time the
monopoly period ends, the technology covered by the patent would have become
obsolete and no one will be interested in using an obsolete technology. Thus, in effect,
the intitial monopoly of the 14 years virtually becomes the complete monopoly for the
entire life cycle of that technology.

4. Just reward or undue advantage
The third argument presented for the continuance of the patent system suggests
that the system offers a reward for the expenses of developing inventions to the stage
at which they are commercially practicable. As against this proposition, Prof. Annold
Plant of the London School of Economics argued that the patent system misdirected
resources by over-rewarding innovative ideas and carried with it the danger of
departing from ideal competition.9 According to him, the patent system provides an
undesirable subsidy and this subsidy over-rewarded some inventions while failing to
reward the others. To substantiate this point, he argued that the marginal rates of
7.

H.M. Jhala, Intellectual Property and Competition Law in India, (1985) N.M. Tripathi, Bombay, pp.
5 - 30.

8.

9.

Section 53 of the Indian Patents Act. Except in case of the process patents for food, medicine and
drug, the life of a patent shall be 14 years. The excluded categories shall have a term of 5 years
from the date of sealing or 7 years from the date of application, whichever is less.
Arnold Plant, The Economic TheOlY Concerning Paten IS for Inventions, Economica (1934) - New
Series I, pp. 30-51.
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returns to producers of new methods and new products is relatively great while
returns to innovators who suggest substantial improvements to the existing products
and methods is less. Prof. Knight contended that the patent system is undesirable, not
because it over-rewarded inventions, but because it failed to reward true innovators
and gave an undeserved monopoly to the last step routinisers.lOAccording to him, the
patent system misdirects rewards for innovation. Under this system, the patent reward
went to the person .who put the finishing touch-or the one who drove the last and
easiest mile on the long race to marketability.
Now-a-days, inventions and innovations are consciously worked on after the
need for such inventions is felt by the industry. Considering the scope of global
Research and Development outlay, and the fact that competing industries are working
on the same problem, it is common for inventors to land upon an invention more or
less simultaneously. Under the Indian system, the patent reward will go to the person
who applied first for the patent. The efforts of the other competitors, who applied
subsequently or who did not apply for a patent at all, will go in vain. The patent
system, unlike the law of trade marks, does not recognise the rights of the "bona fide
concurrent user".ll Hence, the patent reward to the first applicant totally deprives the
second or concurrent inventors of the fruits of their own labour, by awarding a
monopoly to the first applicant in respect of the technolo!,'Ycovered in the patent
specification.
Further, very often, academicians work on current practical problems, and
propose many possible, albeit, not perfect solutions. The industrial community
continues to benefit greatly from the "pure research" done by the academicians.
Besides, the scientific manpower utilised by the industrial community is educated and
trained at enormous expense to the public exchequer. For example, it has been
estimated that the Government of India spends at least Rs. 2,00,000 a year on every
student pursuing his course in the IITs. On a student who has pursued about 7 years
of study, (Graduation & Post-graduation) in these institutions. the Government would
have spent at least Rs. 14,00,000.Such a student will normally join the research wing
of one of the Transnational Corporations on a monthly salary of Rs. 3,500,
immediately after the completion of his course. If he lands up on an important
invention after a year, the patent right for that invention should go to his employer by
virtue of his contract of employment. Even assuming that the company had spent
some money in educating and training a scientist, the initial contribution made by the
Government in training and developing skilled manpower goes totally unrecognised.
Under the present system, the private employer reaps the benefits of government
spending on developing trained scientific man power. Is this fair?

5. Is the patent system an inducement to invest capital in new lines of
production?
The next argument in support of continuance of the patent system contends that
(he system provides an inducement to invest capital in new lines of production which
10.
11.

F.H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty & Profit (1957) cited from H.M. Jhala, p. 6.
Section 33 of the Indian Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. 1958.
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might not appear profitable, if competing producers embarked upon that venture
simultaneously. Research studies undertaken--abroad on this question prove otherwise.
Mr. 00.1. Firestone, in his works "The Economic Impact of the Patent System" and
"Economic Implication of Patents,,/2 concluded that, while the majority of companies
look at the patent system as a major inducement to innovate, a large part of Research
and Development work would continue to take place in Canada, even if that country
had no patent system. Three-fourths of the Research and Development work carried
on in Canada was proceeded on for good economic reasons, the patent protection
being only a minor factor. The competition in the relevant field was the greatest factor
in influencing the type and dimension of the Research and Development programmes.
Andrew Wilson, in his report for the Scientific Council of Canada (1970)
contends that patents play little or nb part in the initiation of research programs, but
may playa larger part in the initiation of development work.13 According to him, there
is little justification in maintaining the patent system for the psychological spur that
the system provides for the decision to undertake research. Furthermore, it has been
estimated that the expenditure on Research and Development before initiating a new
product in the market does not constitute more than 10% of the total cost of the new
product. The rest ninety per cent cost is incurred for commissioning
the
manufacturing plant, advertising, marketing, etc .. Hence, mere spending of 10% of
the total cost of manufacture Ciin hardly justify.a grant of monopoly in favour of the
company that lands upon an invention.

6. Criticisms against the operation of the patent system
SJ. Patel has pointed out that Transnational Corporations belonging to just 6
countries (U.SA., F.R.G., U.K., France, Japan and Switzerland) own more than 90%
of the total patents that are in force. Nationals from the developing countries do not
even own one per cent of the total patents. Of all the patents granted by the
developing countries to the foreigners, not even 5% of the patents are commercially
worked in the territories of the granting States. The rest are plainly used to secure
i~port
monopolies.
Of all the inter-relationship
between the developed and
devfloping countries, the industrial property system is obviously the most unequal and
certainly the most inequitable.14 Transfer of technology by means of international
patent system is strikingly similar to the transfer of land under the feudal order. Nowa-days technology is only leased and seldom sold. Thus technology has become an
instrument of domination in the hands of Transnational
Corporations and the
international patent system confers legitimacy to this form of domination.
It is widely felt that the patent system is greatly abused. The term "abuse" must
be understood in a wider sense. It covers not only practices that are contrary to patent
law but also those that conflict with the basic intentions of the law-maker. In the
12.
13.
14.

O.J. Firestone: Economic Impact of Patents and Economic Implications of Patents, (1971) University
of Ottawa, Canada.
Andrew Wilson, Special Stlidy no. 11 for Scientific Cotmcil of Canada, (1970) Anti-Trust Law
JoumaI49/1.
Recuil de COUTS,COHeque Work Shop, (1980) S.J. fatH, New International Bconomic Order and
the Technological Transformation of the 1bird World, pp. 221-231.
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former category come the various restrictive trade practices that accompany a patent
licensing agreement. Non-working of patents and 'fencing in' of patents (obtaining a
monopoly not for the applicant's commercial exploitation but to prevent his
competitors from using the technology) come in the latter category. The
Transnational Corporations have obtained a large number of patents in their
respective areas of operation. The sum total of the powers derived from a group of
patents is greater than powers arising from individual patents. These powers are being
extensively used to enhance the position of the Transnational Corporations and their
ability to control the market. The various abuses of the patent system have been
chronicled by the U.N. and its specialised agencies.15

7. Is there a substitute for patent system?
Thus, it is clear that all the reasons that are adduced in, support of the
continuance of the patent system are either untenable or grossly ex?ggerated. Even
the Banks Committee Report observed that the temporary monopoly given by the
patent system should be accepted no~s an ideal means of allocating resources, but as
a feasible, yet imperfect means. Hence the report granted the benefit of doubt for the
continuance of the patent system. Justice Iyengar also quotes F. Vaughanl6 lamenting
on the situation in U.S.A.: "It is a contravention of our patent law and economic
injustice to the American manufacturers to allow a foreigner to take out a patent in
this country merely for the purpose of reserving U.S.A. as a captive market for his
patented product which is manufactured abroad. It means the exclusion of all other
'wduld be inventors' and competitors in respect of the technology covered by.,the
patent and at the same time, the building up of the industry in other countries, to the
detriment of the U.S.A." Applying this argument, Justice Iyengar found that in many
cases, India was deprived of getting goods which were very essential for the health and
safety of the community at cheaper prices because of the patent protection. The
argument of F. Vaughan applied more to India than to U.S.A., as more than ninety
per cent of the patents in India are owned by foreigners. But Justice Iyengar was not
for the abolition of the patent system, as he felt that with all the handicaps which the
system inflicts on the underdevelope'd nations, there is no alternative method for
achieving better results. But,'1tt my opinion, the "inventor certificate ~ystem", as
practised by the socialistic nations'is worth em4lating by the developing nations:
Such a course of action was suggested in a working paper presented to the
Canadian Government. It said Canada should give serious consideration to the
possibility of abandoning the patent system. If the patent system were, in fact,
abandoned, Canada should alternatively adopt a substitute system to provide
incentives to inventors. One such alternative is the inventor certificate model of the
Socialistic Bloc.

15.

16.

The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, Report of the
Secretary General of the U.N., New York. United Nations, 1964 Document E/3861/Rev. 1 Marclr
1964; The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to Developing 'Countries - G.l
Resolution, 1713 (XVI) January, 1964.
'
F. Vaughan, U.S. Patent System (1956) University of Oklahama Press.
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8. Inventor certificate system
Under the system, the employee inventor is granted certificate of authorship and
the State acquires an exclusive (sometimes perpetual) ownership of his idea.
Accordingly, the State itself is responsible for the adequate utilisation of the invention
assuring maximum remuneration for the inventor whose royalty will depend on the
total value of the economic and other benefits resulting from the utilisation of his
innovation.
The invention covered by the certificate of authorship may be utilised free of
charge, without any authorisation, by all socia]ised economic units. However, it must
Je remembered that even these nations maintain this system, in addition to or parallel
to the existing patent system rather than replacing it. Article 4A of the Paris
Convention (Stockholm Draft) gives the option to the inventor to choose the form of
protection that he desires. Since most of the Transnational Corporations choose to
have a patent, it cannot be said that the system of inventor certificates has replaced
the regime of the patent.17

9. Merits of inventor certificate system
The inventor certificate system sounds better than the existing patent regime on
the following grounds:
(a)

Unlike the private monopoly granted over the invented technology under
the patent regime, the inventor certificate system vests the ownership of the
technology in the State.

(b)

The secretive nature of technology nurtured by the existing patent system
will slowly wither away under the inventor certificate. As an inventor is
anxious to get increased royalties, he would disclose all what he knows
about his invention, so that the intending users get fully convinced of the
utility of the technology for their purpose.

(c)

The absence of prior permission under the inventor certificate system,
makes it more attractive for competitors. Under this system, apart from th,,:
royalty costs, that too to be fixed by the State, there are no barriers to enter
the market and use the new technology. The compulsory licence system as
provided under the existing system has proved to be ineffective if a
competitor wants to use a patented new technology.

(d) As already pointed out, the inventor certificate system does away with the
need to obtain prior permission. Hence, it totally eliminates the restrictive
trade practices that accompany a patent licence agreement. The users of
the technology covered by the inventor certificate are only obligated to
inform the State of the use of the technology covered by the certificate. The
State in turn coHects the royalty from the users and pays a part of it to the
17.

H.M. Jhala: op cir: note 7, pp. 25-29.
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inventor. Whereas the licence fee for the patented invention is substantial
and paid by the licence holder as determined by the patent holder; the
royalties under the certificate system are paid by the State. This encourages
increased adoption and diffusion of technology.
If the goal of the patent system is to encourage research and disclosure of new
inventions, the inventor certificate system may be the best economic instrument to
attain that end. Licensing practices under this system had not encouraged the
monopolistic restrictive trade practices in technology transfer transactions. There is
no concrete evidence to show that the system has retarded the inventive activities of
those nations which have switched over to the inventor certificate system. All that can
be said in conclusion is that there is no need to burden O'lr economy with a system
'.vhose utility is very much in doubt. But more inter-disciplinary studies have to be
carried out to ensure that technology does not become captive in a few rich hands. It
must also b~ made sure that instead of humans becoming subservient to technology
invented by the fellow humans, technology should serve humans as yet-another tool.

* * * *

